Weekly Law Update on Florida Divorce & Child Custody Cases

Weekly summaries of decisions made by Florida Court of Appeals on actual divorce, child custody, child support and alimony cases.

Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for Week Ending August 30, 2015

September 1, 2015

Below are summaries of recent decisions from Florida's appellate courts on Florida divorce and family law issues. Clicking on the case name allows you to view the appellate opinion described in the analysis below. These summaries are courtesy of Bruce Law Firm, P.A., a law firm limited to representation of clients in the mediation, litigation and appeals of Florida marital and family law matters. The firm also created and maintains the family law focused appellate resources website DivorceCourtAppeals.com.

Case:              Niekamp v. Niekamp
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: John S. Carlin.
Attorneys:     Sam R. Assini, Matthew P. Irwin, Luis E. Insignares.
Issues:           Equitable Distribution, Time-sharing, Spousal Support, Child Support, Imputing Income, Attorney’s Fees.
Holding:         Parental Responsibility

Final judgment that provides sole parental responsibility to one party and denies contact to the other must set out for the parent who losing contact what must be done to reconnect with the children. An order that does not do so is deficient as it fails to advise the parent what is expected and prevents a successor judge from monitoring the parent's progress.

Marital Assets

When an asset is acquired during the marriage, it is presumed to be marital unless specifically established otherwise. In considering a business as a marital asset, enterprise goodwill is a distributable marital asset and personal goodwill is non-marital. When a trial court makes an equitable distribution award of a business, characterized as a marital asset, a value must be assigned to the asset.

Alimony

A twenty-two-year marriage is presumed to be long-term. This places a presumption in favor of alimony when warranted by one party's need and the other party's ability to pay. In determining an alimony award, a trial court shall consider the parties' respective physical and emotional conditions and employability.

Dissipation of Assets

When a spouse depletes marital assets during the pendency of dissolution proceedings to pay for support, living expenses and litigation expenses, it is error to include the assets in the equitable distribution scheme unless a there is a specific finding of intentional misconduct. Such a finding must be based on evidence showing that the marital funds were used for one party's own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.

In this case, the trial court erred in that:

a.     The final judgment failed to prescribe any schedule or benchmarks for re-establishing the Former Husband’s parenting of the children.

b.     It classified the Former Wife’s business as a non-marital asset, which although it depended heavily on her personal expertise and goodwill had tangible assets (bank accounts, instructional books and enterprise goodwill).

c.     It distributed a non-existent asset to the Former Husband (being money that he withdrew from retirement accounts spent on attorney's fees).

d.     It determined the Former Husband was voluntarily unemployed when there was evidence showing he was unemployed for mental health reasons.

e.     It imputed income to him in relation to child support and in its determination regarding payment of attorney’s fees.

The appeals court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Case:              Kyriacou v. Kyriacou
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: John S. Carlin.
Attorneys:     Matthew S. Toll, Stephen N. McGuire, II, Robert B. Burandt.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution.

Holding: Florida Statutes prescribe terms for the distribution of marital assets. The presumption is the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification otherwise based on the statutorily enumerated factors including the economic circumstances of the parties and any other equitable considerations. Wage earning ability is one such factor although disparate earning capacity, without more, cannot be the sole basis for unequal distribution. In this case, the trial court erred when it made an unequal equitable distribution award when the record contained no indication that it considered the statutory factors listed in doing so. Specifically, it focused on the parties’ earning ability and little else. The appeals court reversed as to equitable distribution and the valuation of certain marital assets.

Case:              Hooker v. Hooker
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Gregory M. Keyser.
Attorneys: Jane Kreusler-Walsh, Rebecca Mercier Vargas, Stephanie L. Serafin, Melinda P. Gamot, Susan G. Chopin.
Issues:           Equitable Distribution.

Holding:        Florida Statutes allow for unequal distribution of an asset when a trial court finds it is justified based on a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors including, among other things, the contributions of each spouse to the marriage; each spouse’s economic circumstances; desirability of retaining an asset; the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition and enhancement of an asset; and any other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.

The statutes also require any distribution of marital assets to be supported by factual findings in the judgment based on competent substantial evidence in the record with reference to these statutory factors.

The fact that an asset is determined to be an interspousal gift and then characterized as a marital asset does not mandate that the asset be split equally if an unequal split is will create equity and justice between the parties. An interspousal gift is established by showing donative intent; delivery or possession of the gift; and surrender of dominion and control of the gift. The burden is on the party seeking to prove an interest in the property to show it was an interspousal gift on a preponderance of credible evidence. An appeals court reviews the determinations of a trial court in regards to a dissolution judgment for an abuse of discretion, and the review of the legal conclusions is de novo. When reversible error occurs with regard to valuation or distribution, the entire distribution scheme must be reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to ensure both parties receive equity and justice.

In this case, the trial court was correct in determining one property was gifted to the Former Wife. It erred, however, in determining the other property was an interspousal gift when the evidence did not show a clear and unmistakable intention on the part of the Former Husband to gift it.

With regard to the erroneous determination, there was no testimony that the Former Husband expressly stated or affirmatively acknowledged that the Former Wife had an interest in the property. The evidence only showed that the Former Wife believed that she had an interest because the family home and family business were situated on it. Specifically, the trial court erred in relying on evidence that:

a.     The Former Husband did not convey to the Former Wife that she did not have an interest in the properties;

b.     He did not contradict her belief that it was a gift; and

c.     She had made significant contributions to the property.

The trial court did not properly consider evidence that showed that the Former Wife’s name was kept off the title and the original mortgage for the property and off the corporation created by the Former Husband related to the property (formed solely in his name). The fact that he subsequently included the Former Wife’s name in the final sale of the property did not evidence donative intent. It simply showed the Former Husband ensuring the buyer of unburdened title.

As for the property that was gifted, the evidence provided sufficient donative intent to uphold the trial court’s determination. The Former Husband’s actions showed clear and unmistakable intent as the property was where the Former Wife desired to live; he told her the home was for both of them; they both contributed to furnishing the home; he provided her with keys to it; and she had unfettered access.

The appeals court reversed the amended final judgment as to the trial court’s determination that the Former Husband gifted an interest in the one property to the Former Wife and remanded for a recalculation of the entire equitable distribution.

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The Bruce Law Firm, P.A. is limited to the resolution of marital and family la w matters in Florida’s trial and appellate courts. The firm handles divorce litigation in South Florida and accepts referrals for appellate representation in all of Florida’s appellate courts. The firm pays referral fees in accordance with Florida Bar Rules for appellate matters, which are handled primarily on a fixed fee basis with a limited money back promise if the brief is not filed within 45 days of the firm receiving the transcript and record on appeal.

Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for 3 Weeks Ending August 16, 2015

August 20, 2015

Case:              Stoltzfus v. Stoltzfus
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Marc B. Gilner.
Attorneys:     Troy H. Myers, Jr., Mark C. Dungan, Lori M. Dorman.
Issues:            Alimony.

Holding:         Moneys from retirement accounts which are distributed to the parties are considered income for the purpose of determining alimony where the principal of the retirement account will not be invaded for the purpose of support. It does not matter whether the party has attained the age at which funds may be withdrawn without penalty. Under Florida Statutes (2013), income includes retirement benefits, pensions, dividends, and interest. In this case, the trial court erred in not considering as income interest from pension accounts distributed to the Former Wife and interest-generating equalization payments from the Former Husband. The interest earned on the equalization payments fell within the statutory definition of income and should have been considered in calculating the Former Wife's income. The amended final judgment also contained a mathematical error in the calculation of the Former Wife's need. The appeals court reversed and remanded for a redetermination and recalculation.

Case:              Garcia v. Garcia
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Barbara Areces.
Attorneys:     Douglas Isenberg.
Issues:            Child support.

Holding:         Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a magistrate is responsible for creating an accurate and complete record of proceedings. A trial court may not adopt or ratify a magistrate’s report if he or she fails to file a complete record of the evidence with the report, regardless of whether exceptions have been filed to that report. If a trial court has not received a complete record, all subsequent actions based on such reports and recommendations may be deemed erroneous. In this case, the trial court erred when it ratified the general magistrate’s report despite having an incomplete record of the proceedings. A transcript from the hearing during which the testimony of the Former Husband and his accountant could not be prepared as the recording was inaudible. The testimony was absent from the record provided to the trial judge. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions to conduct further proceedings.

Case:              Hall v. Hall
Court:            Fouth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Timothy L. Bailey.
Attorneys:     Virginia R. Vetter, Susana Rice Roque, Linda M. Jaffe.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Marital Settlement Agreements.

Holding:         Two grounds lie for setting aside or modifying a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA):

1.     By establishing that it was reached under fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching.

2.     By establishing the MSA makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for a former spouse, given the circumstances of the parties as shown by evidence of the parties’ relative situations (including their respective ages, health, education, and financial status). For this, determination, the trial court must find that the agreement is disproportionate to the means of the defending spouse, shown by record evidence of his or her financial means. If the MSA is found to be unreasonable, a presumption arises that either the defending spouse concealed relevant information or the challenging spouse lacked information regarding the defending spouse’s finances when the MSA was reached. The defending spouse can rebut by showing that there was full, frank disclosure or that the challenging spouse had a general and approximate knowledge of the marital property. The test is the challenging spouse’s such knowledge at the time of the MSA and whether he or she is prejudiced by lack of information.

Refusal to allow an amendment is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion unless it clearly appears that allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been abused, or amendment would be futile.

MSA Was Valid & Enforceable

Regarding the first ground, the Former Husband did not present evidence that the Former Wife or her attorney engaged in any fraud, duress, etc during the relevant proceedings. Rather, his position is that his attorney forgot to present an alleged first (missing) page of a draft version of the MSA to the Former Wife for her to consider.

As to the second ground, the Former Husband did not present evidence as to the parties’ relative situations to allow a trial court to make a decision as to its being unreasonable. The form of the MSA accepted by the trial court contained the style of the case, a clear heading, the parties’ initials, a signature page, and addressed the parties’ financial accounts by stating that they agreed to certain aspects of distribution. As such, and since he did not provide evidence of a purported additional page, the trial court did not err by ruling that the MSA filed by Former Wife was a valid, enforceable agreement.

Permission to Amend

The trial court erred when it denied the Former Husband’s motion to amend his answer on the grounds that it had been 18 months since the Former Wife filed her petition and the case was 30 days from trial. On the facts, it is not clear that allowing Former Husband leave to amend would have prejudiced Former Wife. Nor did he abuse the privilege to amend as this was his first such request. Finally, he sought to amend to raise and address relevant issues.

The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions to allow Former Husband to file his amended answer.

Case:              Kemp v. Kemp
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Daniel F. Wilensky.
Attorneys:     Seth Schwartz, Eric Lawson, Allison E. Folds.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Attorney’s Fees.

Holding: A trial court may not order an interim partial equitable distribution in the absence of a verified motion requesting same. In this case the trial court erred when, after a hearing on the Former Wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees (past due and prospective) issued an order finding that the Former Husband lacked the ability to pay her attorney’s fees and directed what was effectively an interim partial equitable distribution instead. The trial court lacked authority to do so as the relevant statutory requirements for such an order were not met. The trial court misapplied the law and failed to make proper findings to support its order. The appeals court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the Former Wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees.

Case:              Freiha v. Freiha
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Charles W. Arnold.
Attorneys:     William S. Graessle, Jonathan W. Graessle, Rebecca Bowen Creed.
Issues:            Procedure.

Holding:         An appeal on a non-final Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is premature. Where judgment is partial; reserves jurisdiction to expend additional judicial labor over further matters, such as non-collateral issues of child support and parental responsibility; or retains jurisdiction over integrally related issues, an appeal may be premature and improper. In this case, the appellant pursued appeal on a Final Order of Judgment that did not finally resolve integral matters. The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant to file a notice of appeal upon the rendition of a final order.

Case:              J.C. v. D.C.F.
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Rosa C. Figarola.
Attorneys:     Richard F. Joyce, Karla F. Perkins, Laura E. Lawson (Sanford).
Issues:            Termination, Case Plan.

Holding:         An order for termination must sufficiently articulates the trial court’s considerations and findings. However, if record evidence and the detailed considerations of the trial court support a finding of termination, the wording of the order in that regard may be viewed as harmless error. In this case, the trial court erred in rendering an order that was did not sufficiently articulate that the Mother: (i) materially breached her case plan, and (ii) would be unlikely or unable to comply substantially with the case plan prior to its expiration. However, the appeals court determined this was harmless error as record evidence, together with the trial court’s detailed consideration of the Mother’s conduct, supported such an order for termination. The appeals court affirmed.

Case:              Lopez v. Lopez
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Arthur M. Birken, Merrilee Ehrlich.
Attorneys:     Venol C. Adams, Susan R. Brown.
Issues:            Custody, Time-sharing.

Holding:         Orders determining the rights or obligations of a party regarding child custody or time-sharing under a parenting plan can be non-final orders. A timely motion for rehearing will suspend the rendition of a final order until the order disposing of the motion for rehearing is entered. However, a motion for rehearing does not suspend the rendition of a non-final order. Notice must be timely. In this case, the appellant (Father) appealed an order for custody, visitation and proposing a time-sharing schedule, which was conditioned on the successful outcome of reunification therapy. This was a non-final order. His notice of appeal was not filed within the procedural timelines (in this case, within thirty days) after the non-final order was rendered. The appeals court was required to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Case:              Whissell v. Whissell
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Jeffrey Dana Gillen.
Attorneys:     Karen J. Haas, Jonathan S. Root.
Issues:            Contempt, Procedure.

Holding: Where an appellant has disobeyed an order of the trial court, the appellate court may, in its discretion, either entertain or dismiss an appeal. However, where a dismissal is ordered it is mandatory that the non-compliant appellant must be given a period of grace, prior to the effective date of the dismissal, in which to comply with the order(s) at issue.

In this case, the appellant repeatedly refused to comply with the trial court’s orders regarding temporary support and discovery, resulting in four findings of contempt and three writs of bodily attachment. The appellant (Former Husband) was incarcerated for such conduct and was released only after he made some payment on arrearages and promised the trial court future compliance, which he ultimately breached. The appeals court ordered the appeal be dismissed unless he established substantial compliance with the extant orders within 30 days of the appeal court decision. Jurisdiction was relinquished to the trial court for 30 days to determine the appellant’s compliance and provide a status report.

Case:              Chianese v. Brady
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Timothy Bailey.
Attorneys:     Nancy A. Hass, Cynthia L. Greene.
Issues:            Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:         The award of attorney’s fees is premised on the parties’ respective need and ability to pay. Notwithstanding, the trial court must also determine the reasonableness of the fees before ordering a party to pay fees. In this case, the trial court did not err in denying the Mother further attorney’s fees. The trial court determined that the case was “out of control”, the Mother had failed to prove the reasonableness of the fees requested, and the Father has already paid her temporary attorney’s fees. Specifically, it had previously awarded the Mother $30,000.00 for temporary fees, then denied a subsequent request for more, which denial was affirmed on appeal. She then filed an additional (third) motion for temporary attorney’s fees on the grounds that further substantial financial discovery was required as the Father was objecting and new and novel theories to obtain an increase in child support were being advanced. The appeals court affirmed the denial of additional fees.

Case:              Hutchinson v. Hutchinson
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Monica J. Brasington.
Attorneys:     Stephen K. Johnson, Emily A. Snider, Jonathan P. Culver.
Issues:            Alimony, Attorney’s Fees.

Holding: An award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Under Florida Statute, such awards are to ensure that both parties have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel. The general consideration is the requesting spouse’s financial need and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Where the parties are equally able to pay attorney’s fees, the trial court abuses its discretion by requiring one spouse to pay the other’s fees. Where marital property has been equitably distributed and alimony is awarded such that the parties’ incomes have been equalized, a trial court abuses its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees. In this case, the trial court erred in that it awarded the Former Wife attorney’s fees after it had rendered final judgment by which equitable distribution and alimony left the parties in substantially the same financial position. The appeal court reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Case:              Earl v. Earl
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Thomas H. Barkdull, III.
Attorneys:     Jane Kreusler-Walsh, Stephanie L. Serafin, Troy William Klein.
Issues:            Alimony, Procedure.

Holding:         The written findings of a trial court must conform with the oral pronouncement. In this case, the trial court erred in failing to provide that the Former Husband obtain and maintain life insurance in the (written) final judgment of dissolution despite having made such a determination in the oral pronouncement. The appeals court reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to include the Former Husband’s requirement to maintain life insurance.

Case:              Somasca v. Somasca
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: John S. Carlin.
Attorneys:    J P. Brandon Perkins, Kristen D. Perkins, Brett C. Powell, Alexander Brockmeyer, Katheryn E. Smith.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution.

Holding: When marital assets are used during the marriage to reduce the mortgage on non-marital property, the increase in equity on the property is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The increase in equity is not to be confused with the concept of the appreciation in the overall value of the asset. The enhancement in equity is captured under Florida Statute, which holds that marital assets and liabilities include, among other things, the enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both.

In this case, the trial court erred in its treatment of the reduction in the mortgage indebtedness on a building the Former Husband purchased prior to the marriage, which had depreciated in value (a non-marital asset). The parties used marital funds to reduce the mortgage on the building, which resulted in the Former Husband obtaining enhanced equity in the building despite the building depreciating in value during the parties’ marriage. The trial court erred in failing to give the Former Wife a credit for the use of marital funds to pay down the mortgage. The appeals court reversed the equitable distribution and remanded for correction.

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Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for Week Ending July 12, 2015

July 14, 2015

Case:             Thompson v. Malicki
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Lee Ann Schreiber.
Attorneys:     Christopher R. Bruce.
Issues: Relocation, Modification, Child Support

Holding: A trial court's imputation of income must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. When calculating child support, Florida Statutes (2011) provide that the trial court shall impute income to a voluntarily unemployed or underemployed parent absent a finding of fact by the court of physical or mental incapacity or other circumstances over which the parent has no control. Where income is to be imputed, the employment potential and probable earnings level of the parent shall be determined based upon his or her recent work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings level in the community if such information is available.

In this case the trial court did not err as to its modification of timesharing and the denial of relocation as those findings were based on cogent, substantial evidence. However, the trial court erred when it based an award of child on imputed income of the Former Wife which was not supported by sufficient findings or evidence. Reliance on past work history alone is insufficient to support imputation of income. Particularized findings are required regarding work history, occupational qualifications, and the current job market in the community to support the imputation of income. Failure to make these findings results in reversal.

The appeals court remanded for the trial court to take further evidence on this issue and recalculate the amount of child support as necessary.

Case:             J.B. etc v. Florida D.C.F.
Court: Florida Supreme Court.
Trial Judge:
Attorneys: Stephanie Christina Zimmerman, Dwight Oneal Slater, Ryan Thomas Truskoski, George E. Schulz, Jr., Robin L. Rosenberg, Wendie Michelle Cooper, Kelley Ruth Schaeffer.
Issues:            Termination, Process.

Holding:         The right to counsel in termination of parental right (TPR) proceedings includes the right to effective assistance and requires a means of vindicating that right.
The Supreme Court considered two questions.

1.    Is the criminal standard of ineffective assistance of counsel applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in proceedings involving the termination of parental rights? The SC answered in the negative.

2.  Is any procedure available following the termination of parental rights to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are not apparent on the face of the record? The SC answered in the affirmative.The Supreme Court:

a. established the appropriate standard for determining whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in termination of parental rights proceedings;

b. provided a temporary process for bringing such claims of ineffective assistance; and

c. directed the development of rules providing the procedure for vindicating that right.

1.     The Right to Counsel

Under Florida statutory law, parents have a right to counsel in both dependency and TPR proceedings. While the appointment of counsel is not required by the constitution, it is required under the due process clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions, in proceedings involving the permanent termination of parental rights to a child.

2.     The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

The right of indigent parents to counsel under the Florida Constitution in TPR proceedings necessarily includes the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

3.     The Standard for Ineffective Assistance

The standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel claims is that the parent must establish that the result of the TPR proceeding would have been different but for the attorney’s deficient performance. Once tis is established, then the order terminating parental rights should be vacated, and the case returned to the circuit court for further proceedings.

4. Temporary Procedure for Ineffective Assistance Claims in TPR Cases

Post-TPR proceedings must be expeditious. A permanent such process will be developed. The Supreme Court set an interim process for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following the termination of parental rights. This interim process requires that claims of ineffective assistance first must be raised by the parent and ruled on by the trial court. The trial judge must ensure that the parents whose rights are at issue are informed of those rights such that at the end of each TPR adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court shall orally inform the parents for whom counsel was appointed regarding the right to:

(1) appeal the order entered at the end of the TPR proceedings to the district court; and

(2) file a motion in the circuit court alleging that appointed counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance (if the court terminates parental rights).

In addition, a written order terminating parental rights shall include a brief statement informing the parents of the right to effective assistance and a brief explanation of the procedure for filing such a claim. Indigent parents (likewise without the assistance of appointed counsel) must file a motion in the circuit court claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the TPR proceeding. Appeal from an order denying a motion alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel will be raised and addressed within any appeal from the order terminating parental rights. A parent, without assistance of appointed counsel, shall have twenty (20) days after the termination judgment issues within which to file a motion in the trial court alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion must contain the case name and number; the date the order of termination of parental rights issued; the specific acts or omissions in trial counsel’s representation of the parent during the TPR proceedings that the parent alleges constituted a failure to provide reasonable, professional assistance; and an explanation of how the errors or omissions prejudiced the parent’s case to such an extent that the result would have been different absent the deficient performance.

If a parent files an ineffective assistance of counsel motion, rendition of the order in the TPR proceeding will be tolled for purposes of appeal until the circuit court issues an order on the pro se ineffective assistance motion. If a parent chooses to file a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, then counsel of record cannot continue representation.

If the parent chooses to appeal, the attorney must certify, among other things, that:

a.     the parent so chose;
b.     a notice of appeal signed by counsel;
c.     the parent has been filed; and
d.     an order appointing appellate counsel, if any, has been entered.

Further, the appointed attorney representing an indigent parent, must, after issuance of an order terminating parental rights, discuss appellate remedies and determine whether the parent wants to appeal the TPR order. If the answer is affirmative, counsel must also inquire whether the parent intends to file a motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. If the parent responds affirmatively, then counsel must immediately seek withdrawal on this basis. In addition, if the parent subsequently files a motion alleging ineffective assistance despite the parent’s prior expression of a contrary intent, if counsel of record is also appellate counsel withdrawal is required at that time, and new counsel will be appointed for any appeal from the TPR order and from the disposition of the ineffective assistance of counsel motion.

When a parent files a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, rendition of the trial court’s TPR order will be tolled for purposes of appeal until the trial court rules on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court shall review the ineffective assistance motion and order compilation of the record regarding the termination of parental rights proceedings on an expedited basis. Further, the trial court shall conduct proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing if necessary, to determine whether the motion should be granted or denied. The circuit court shall render an order within twenty-five (25) days after the motion alleging ineffective assistance was filed or the motion shall be deemed denied.

On appeal, the district court will review claims regarding the parent’s appeal from the trial court’s TPR order and from the disposition of the ineffective assistance motion. This process will apply to any case in which a judgment terminating parental rights is entered after this case becomes final. Creation of the permanent process and development of the attendant rules will be the task of a special committee.

In this case, the Supreme Court determined, that the appellant failed to present any basis for setting aside the order terminating her parental rights and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Case:              S.V. v. D.C.F.
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Alan S. Fine.
Attorneys:      Karla F. Perkins, Kele Stewart, Laura E. Lawson.
Issues:            Dependency, Reunification.

Holding:         A certiorari review of the trial court’s non-final order is limited to whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in conducting its review of the general magistrate’s report and recommendations, resulting in irreparable harm to the petitioner that cannot be remedied on direct appeal.

In this case, the trial court did not err as it adhered to the essential requirements of law and applied the correct legal standards when it reviewed the general magistrate’s recommendations. Specifically, the trial court found that competent substantial evidence did not support the general magistrate’s finding that the Father, at this time, had the capacity to meet the children’s extensive and unremitting therapeutic needs. The appeals court denied the petition to review the lower court decision.

Case:             Quinn v. Quinn
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: John A. Schaefer.
Attorneys:      Ingrid Anderson.
Issues:            Child Support, Equitable Distribution.

Holding:         When a parenting plan provides that the children will spend a "substantial amount of time" with each parent, defined as at least twenty per cent of the overnights per year, the award of child support should be adjusted as set forth in Florida Statutes (2013), requiring calculation based in part on the percentage of overnights the children spend with each parent. While the statute presumptively establishes the amount of child support, the court may deviate from the presumptive amount based on numerous factors, including the obligee parent’s low income and ability to maintain the basic necessities of the home for the child, the likelihood that either parent will actually exercise the time-sharing schedule set forth in the parenting plan and whether all of the children are exercising the same time-sharing schedule. If the trial court wishes to deviate from the presumptive amount by more than five percent, the final judgment must include findings of fact to support the deviation and explain why the guidelines amount is unjust or inappropriate.

In this case, the trial court erred in ordering a number of overnights to each parent that contradicted those ordered in the parenting plan without explaining the discrepancy. This was an error on the face of the judgment requiring the appeals court to reverse and remand.

Case:             Sikora v. Sikora
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge: Richard A. Nielsen.
Attorneys:      Christine A. Hearn, Steven L. Brannock, Mark F. Baseman.
Issues:            Alimony, Equitable Distribution, Imputation.

Holding:         Permanent Periodic Alimony

Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a Former Spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties. Absent special circumstances, an alimony award should not exceed a Recipients Spouse's need (excessive awards constitute an abuse of discretion). In the absence of special circumstances, a trial court errs by awarding permanent, periodic alimony in an amount that exceeds a Former Spouse’s established needs. In this case, the trial court failed to include findings detailing any special circumstance that would explain why alimony was awarded in an amount exceeding the amount necessary to meet the Former Wife's need. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the trial court to either include such findings or reconsider the issue in its entirety.

Imputation

Trial courts may impute income from interest earned on retirement accounts if the income is readily available to a Former Spouse without penalty and without the need to reduce the principal. However, any decision to impute income must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. In this case, the trial court erred by imputing income to the Former Wife from her retirement accounts where there was no evidence to support the specific rate of return used by the trial court. Nor was there an agreement of the experts on the rate of return for the retirement accounts or evidence of the historical rate of return. Rather, the trial court selected the same rate of return used for imputing income on the Former Wife's investment accounts. The appeals court remanded with directions to adjust the alimony award accordingly.

Retroactivity

Generally, when a trial court awards alimony, it abuses its discretion if it fails to make the award retroactive to the date of filing the petition for dissolution. There is an exception where the trial court enters a temporary alimony award during the pendency of the case. In that situation, a retroactive award is limited to the date that the request for an increased award is filed. However, a temporary alimony award can be readdressed at a final hearing if the temporary award was made "without prejudice."

In this case, the parties stipulated that the Former Husband would pay temporary alimony, and the court awarded temporary alimony "without prejudice” such that the issue of temporary alimony could be readdressed at the final hearing. The appeals court ordered the reversal of the permanent, periodic alimony award, and on remand, directed the trial court reconsider the issue of retroactivity of any newly imposed permanent, periodic alimony award (after comparing such award to the stipulated temporary alimony).

Life Insurance

A trial court must include findings relating to a Former Spouse’s insurability at the time of trial and the cost of an insurance policy. In this case the trial court erred when it ordered the Former Husband to secure an insurance policy in the absence of any explanation for how this amount was arrived at or what it was based on. Moreover, trial court's failure to explain how it arrived at the specific dollar requirement was troublesome because the specific amount of coverage bore no correlation to projected alimony amounts and it was not possible for the appeals court to ascertain if the trial court ordered life insurance for purposes other than securing alimony due at the time of the Former Husband's death.

Lump Sum Alimony

Courts have previously reversed lump sum alimony awards that have no evidentiary support. In this case, there was no evidence to justify the lump sum alimony award, and the trial court made no findings to explain its rationale. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the award based on the evidence on the record.

Attributing Dissipated Assets as Part of Equitable Distribution

It is error to include assets in an equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings. However, an exception to this general proposition exists when misconduct during the dissolution proceedings results in the dissipation of a marital asset. The misconduct necessary to support inclusion of dissipated assets in an equitable distribution scheme does not include mismanagement or simple squandering of marital assets in a manner of which the other spouse disapproves. Instead, to include a dissipated asset in the equitable distribution scheme, there must be evidence of the spending spouse's intentional dissipation or destruction of the asset, and the trial court must make a specific finding that the dissipation resulted from intentional misconduct.

n this case, the trial court erred failing to apply to the standard for attributing dissipated assets to a spouse in dissolution proceedings. Specifically, the trial court erred in attributing monies to the Former Wife in the equitable distribution in such a way that amounted to a sanction for failing to comply with a documenting requirement. The appeals court reversed the trial court's equitable distribution awards and remanded for further proceedings.

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