Weekly Law Update on Florida Divorce & Child Custody Cases

Weekly summaries of decisions made by Florida Court of Appeals on actual divorce, child custody, child support and alimony cases.  

Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for 4 Weeks Ending October 25, 2015

Below are summaries of recent decisions from Florida's appellate courts on Florida divorce and family law issues.  Clicking on the case name allows you to view the appellate opinion described in the analysis below.  These summaries are courtesy of Bruce Law Firm, P.A., a law firm limited to representation of clients in the mediation, litigation and appeals of Florida marital and family law matters.  The firm also created and maintains the family law focused appellate resources website DivorceCourtAppeals.com.


Case:              Lalonde v. Lalonde
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Arthur M. Birken.
Attorneys:     
Issues:            Procedure.

Holding:      Under Florida Rules of Procedure, the requiring thirty days’ notice is mandatory and applicable to final hearings as well as to jury trials. In this case, the trial court erred in proceeding with the hearing and rendering final judgment when the Former Husband did not have at least thirty days’ advance notice.  The appeals court remanded with instructions to the circuit court to set a new final hearing, giving the parties at least 30 days’ notice.


Case:              Miggins v. Miggins
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Krista Marx.
Attorneys:     Doreen Truner Inkeles, Adam M. Zborowski.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution.

Holding:     A party seeking equitable distribution of a military Survivor Benefit Plan shall provide evidence concerning assertions as to the Plan including the cost of maintaining it and how equitable distribution or alimony would be affected. In this case, the trial court was incorrect when it found that the Former Husband’s military Survivor Benefit Plan was not marital property subject to equitable distribution. However, it was correct in its treatment of the Plan. Specifically, the Former Wife presented no evidence concerning the cost of maintaining the Plan and how equitable distribution or alimony would be affected. The appeals court reversed on the issue and remanded for the entering of a second amended final judgment containing language referring to the “existence of a supportive relationship” pursuant to Florida Statutes (2014).


Case:              Hofschneider v. Hofschneider
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Richard A. Nielsen.
Attorneys:     Jeremy T. Simons.
Issues:            Contempt.

Holding:      Pre-judgment civil contempt orders are properly reviewed by certiorari. In this case, as the issue involved review of a contempt order by the trial court, the appeals court converted the matter to a petition for writ of certiorari. It was, however, declined as the Appellant / Applicant did not demonstrate suffering a material injury that could not be corrected on post-judgment appeal.


Case:              B.R. v. D.C.F.
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Sonny Scaff.
Attorneys:     Donald K. Rudser, Ward L. Metzger, Dave Krupski.
Issues:            Dependency.

Holding:      An amendment or modification of an order or judgment in an immaterial, insubstantial way does not re-start the clock to file an appeal. Even substantial or material modifications in an amended judgment do not provide grounds sufficient to appeal issues adversely decided in the earlier judgment. In this case, the appeal was filed in excess of the thirty-days from the date the orders were rendered, one of which contained immaterial changes. The immaterial changes did not re-start the time for proper filing of an appeal.


Case:              J.B.-L v. D.C.F.
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Suzanne Bass.
Attorneys:     Robert W. Keep, Jr., Joshua Goldsborough, Niki Guy, Ward L. Metzger, Wendie Michelle Cooper.
Issues:            Dependency.

Holding:      A trial court order finding a child dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency is properly reviewable by the appeals court pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.  In this case, the trial court did not err in adjudicating only two of seven minor children, dependent but finding all seven of them dependent. The fact that adjudication hearings were conducted on only two matters was not an error. The appeals court affirmed. 


Case:              Shah v. Shah
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:     Mindy S. Glazer.
Attorneys:     Bryant Miller Olive, Elizabeth W. Neiberger, Clayton D. Simmons, Andrew Rier, Daniel Tibbitt.
Issues:            Process.

Holding:      Due process requires proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. In this case, the trial court erred when it noticed the hearing on the petition for dissolution of marriage as a status conference but, instead, conducted a final hearing and entered final judgment. The appeals court reversed.


Case:              De Leon v. Collazo
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Leon M Firtel.
Attorneys:      David W. Macey, Lindsey M. Alter, Jessica B. Reilly.
Issues:            Permanent Injunction for Protection, Process.

Holding:      Due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through the proper administration of justice. It requires that litigants be given proper notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard. To be sufficient, notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must convey the required information, afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance, and indicate the witnesses and the evidence expected.

In this case, the trial court erred when, at the final hearing, it permitted the Applicant, over objection, to testify to substantial and significant acts of domestic violence that were never pleaded in the petition. Nor was the Respondent put on notice that these additional acts would form a part of the allegations relied upon. This violated the Respondent’s due process rights. The appeals court vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for a new final hearing.


 

Case:              Gromet v. Jensen
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Pedro P. Echarte.
Attorneys:     George R. Baise Jr., Brian C. Tackenberg, Robin Buckner, Robert F. Kohlman.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution.

Holding:      A trial court’s determination that an asset is marital or non-marital involves mixed questions of law and fact. Although an appeals court defers to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, it will review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  

Non-marital assets include assets acquired separately by either party by non-interspousal gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and asset acquired in exchange for such assets. Non-marital assets may lose their non-marital character and become marital assets where they have been commingled with marital assets. This is especially true with respect to money because money is fungible, and once commingled it loses its separate character.

Florida Statutes (2014), provide that marital assets include the enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the marriage. Where a former spouse seeks to establish that marital efforts were utilized to enhance the value of the other party’s non-marital business, he or she also has the burden of proving that assertion and the value, based on competent, substantial evidence.

In this case, the trial court erred by treating the Former Husband’s accounts as marital assets subject to equitable distribution, when the accounts were entirely funded with an inheritance he received; the Former Wife failed to present competent, substantial evidence that marital funds were deposited into or commingled with any of the Former Husband’s accounts; and the evidence showed that, despite actively managing his accounts, they decreased in value.  The appeals court reversed the equitable distribution portion of the final judgment.


Case:              Russell v. Pasik
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Marc B. Gilner.
Attorneys:    Paul F. Grondahl, Cristina Alonso, Jessica Zagier Wallace, Michael P. Sampson, Ashley Filimon, Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, Jay A. Yagoda, Luis E. Insignares, Elizabeth Lynn Littrell, Paolo Annino, Brion Blackwelder, Michael J. Dale, Nancy Dowd, Shani M. King, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.
Issues:            Time-sharing.

Holding:      To be entitled to certiorari relief, a party must demonstrate: (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law; (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case; (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal. The second and third elements are jurisdictional and thus must be evaluated first. Typically, certiorari will not be granted from a denial of a motion to dismiss because there is not a material injury that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal.

A psychological parent is not recognized in law. Only natural and adoptive parents have a legal duty to support minor children. When there is no biological connection between a petitioner and a child and that nonparent is seeking to establish legal rights to the child, there is no clear constitutional interest in being a parent.

In this case, the trial court erred as it failed to conduct the proper analysis to determine standing. Further in order to prevent irreparable harm, the trial court must fully assess that issue. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court merely opined that a cause of action arose based on the facts set out in the petition. However, the petition showed that it was legally impossible for the Respondent to establish standing to petition the trial court for timesharing as she asserted she was a de facto or psychological parent and not a biological parent. As a cause of action does not exist in the absence of standing, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by not dismissing the petition for timesharing. Additionally, the trial court improperly addressed the Applicant / Biological Parent’s constitutional privacy interest in the raising of her children, including determining with whom they are allowed to spend time. This would enable the State's interference with a constitutional right—here, the right to privacy, and an injury that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal. The appeals court granted the petition for certiorari.


Case:              Rosenblum v. Rosenblum
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   W. Gregg McCaulie.
Attorneys:     Geraldine C. Hartin.
Issues:            Child Support.

Holding:      A party is entitled to have his or her motion to modify child support or alimony heard and resolved before, or simultaneously with, a hearing on another party’s later-filed motion for contempt. In this case, the trial court erred in proceeding only on a motion for contempt filed by the Former Wife, when the Former Husband had filed a prior motion for modification of child support, despite his repeatedly objecting to proceeding without first or simultaneously resolving the issues raised in his earlier-filed motion. The appeals court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the Former Husband’s motion to modify child support.


Case:              Taylor v. Taylor
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Jalal A. Harb.
Attorneys:     Jean M. Henne, Karie L. Sanoba.
Issues:            Alimony.

Holding:      Generally, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in making alimony awards, due to the lack of an evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events. Under statute, when determining alimony, a trial court considers: (1) a party's need for support; (2) the other party's ability to pay; (3) the type of alimony or the types of alimony appropriate in the case; and (4) the amount of alimony to award.
 

The first two considerations involve questions of fact to be supported by competent, substantial evidence. Once need and ability are determined, the court determines which type, or types, of alimony are appropriate. The court can award (1) bridge-the gap alimony; (2) rehabilitative alimony; (3) durational alimony; (4) permanent alimony or a combination. Statute limits a trial court’s discretion in this regard by making the court consider also the duration of the marriage. The trial court must demonstrate on the record or in its order that it has applied the correct law when selecting its choice of alimony. Under Florida statute, there lies a rebuttable presumption that a marriage of seventeen years or greater is a long-term marriage, for which permanent alimony may be awarded upon consideration of the statutory factors. There is no special burden of proof applicable to the award of permanent alimony in a long-term marriage, however, the court must include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the parties.  Durational alimony may be awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate or if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis. The length of an award of durational alimony can be extended only under exceptional circumstances. There may be need to award a combination of the two.

In this case, the trial court erred in that it did not expressly find that permanent periodic alimony was inappropriate. The trial court erred further in that the judgment failed to contain the necessary findings to support durational alimony. The findings were so deficient as to hinder appellate review.  The appeals court reversed and remanded with special instructions.


Case:              Horrisberger, Jr. v. Horrisberger N/K/A Abbe
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Laurel Moore Lee.
Attorneys:     Kathy C. George.
Issues:            Child Support.
 

Holding:      A trial court errs in determining child support based on a comparison of the gross income of one party to the net income of the other. In this case, the trial court erred in considering separate worksheets filed by the parties, which submitted respectively, figures which represented gross income net income. The appeals court reversed and remanded.


Case:              Cozzo v. Cozzo
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Barbara Areces.
Attorneys:     Kimberly L. Boldt, Teresa Abood Hoffman, Maggie A. Berryman.
Issues:            Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:        Florida law requires a party seeking attorney’s fees to provide proof detailing the nature and extent of the services performed and expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fees. Where a party has provided sufficient, admissible proof of these two components, a trial court will not further mandate direct testimony from the attorney who performed the services. In this case, the trial court failed to provide a record which reveals sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney’s fees. The appeals court reversed the trial court’s order denying the Former Wife’s motion for attorney’s fees, and remanded for entry of an award of fees in accordance with the evidence presented.


Case:              Bush v. Henney
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Laura M. Watson.
Attorneys:     Troy W. Klein.
Issues:            Domestic Injunction.

Holding:      Under Florida statute, a party to a domestic violence injunction may move at any time to modify or dissolve the injunction. No specific allegations are required. If the scenario underlying the injunction no longer exists so that the continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose, then the injunction should be modified or dissolved. In this case, the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dissolve an injunction from approximately 14 years ago when he had never violated it, had never tried to contact the Appellee and he testified that he has no desire or intention of doing so. The appeals court remanded.


Case:              Malave v. Malave et al
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Mark J. Hill.
Attorneys:     William Glenn Roy, III, Tyler J. Chasez, Nichole J. Segal, Andrew A. Harris.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Procedure.

Holding:       Ancillary relief is generally available in dissolution of marriage cases. However, the ancillary relief must relate to matters which are personal and proper to the divorce action itself. The common thread between them is a distinct relationship linking the parties and the subject of the litigation. A circuit court does not lack jurisdiction simply because a case is filed or assigned to the wrong division within the circuit court. All circuit court judges have the same jurisdiction within their respective circuits.  The filing of an action in the wrong division should be remedied by reassignment to the correct division as opposed to a dismissal of the action.

In this case, the family (trial) court erred as it found that it lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action because the Former Husband died before a judgment dissolving the marriage was entered and dismissed, with prejudice, the Former Wife’s ancillary petition. The parties were in the midst of divorce proceedings when the Former Husband and the parties’ children were tragically killed in a car accident. The divorce petition was abated by his death. Subsequently, the Former Wife discovered that he had allegedly made a substantial number of property and money transfers to his relatives shortly before his death. She deduced that the disposal of marital assets was intentional and that other parties, including his lawyer, had assisted in the allegedly fraudulent transfers. She moved to reopen the abated divorce case and to file an ancillary petition naming as defendants the parties whom she believed had assisted him, including his lawyer. The family court granted the motion. The parties named did not file a response. The clerk entered a default against the non-lawyer while the Former Husband’s previous lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the ancillary petition asserting that the family court lost jurisdiction over the divorce case when the husband died. The family court agreed and dismissed the ancillary petition. The appeals court reversed and found that the dismissal with prejudice was improvidently entered, and directed the circuit court to transfer the ancillary petition from its family division to its civil division. The Former Wife’s attempt to sue the Former Husband’s former lawyer for fraud in the divorce action was misplaced, as no judgment had been entered dissolving the marriage at the time of the Former Husband's death. Therefore, the divorce action ended when the Former Husband died. The Former Wife’s ancillary petition itself was not ancillary to the divorce because the Former Husband’s former lawyer was not a party to the divorce litigation. However, the family court should have transferred the matter to the civil division of the circuit court. By dismissing the action with prejudice the trial court completely denied the Former Wife the opportunity to raise her claims anywhere. The appeals court reversed the dismissal with prejudice of the ancillary petition and remanded for further proceedings in the appropriate division of the circuit court.


Case:              Wells v. Whitfield
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   E. McRae Mathis.
Attorneys:     Seth Schwartz, Eric Lawson, Valarie Linnen.
Issues:            Child Support.

Holding:      In awarding child support, a trial court must make findings of fact based on record evidence in support. Meaningful appellate review is facilitated by such findings. In this case, while the trial court did not err (abuse of discretion) by refusing to allow the Father (Payor) to present additional evidence on rehearing, it erred when the amended final judgment did not justify the amount of the child support obligation. Specifically, the trial court properly found the Father failed to show that certain monies should be excluded from his income for child support purposes but failed to state in the amended final judgment how much of that money was part of his income for child support calculations. The appeals court could not meaningfully review the child support award to determine whether it is within the guidelines. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the trial court to make specific findings on point.


Case:              Nicolas v. Blanc
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   John Schlesinger.
Attorneys:      Hegel Laurent, Yolande Henry Van Dam, Barbara Green.
Issues:            Parenting, Relocation.

Holding:       In considering relocation applications, a trial court must properly consider and apply the enumerated factors under Florida Statutes (2014) to the record evidence. It must also articulate findings of fact based on such. In this case, the trial court did not err as it properly considered and applied the requisite and applicable factors under Florida Statutes (2014), and articulated findings of fact, supported by the competent substantial evidence presented. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s order granting relocation.


Case:              Kelley v. Kelley
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Timothy P. McCarthy.
Attorneys:     Troy William Klein, Bernice Marie Kelley.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Alimony, Child Support.

Holding:      Equitable Distribution

In distributing marital assets and liabilities, the presumption is an equal division, however, the court may order an unequal distribution based on factors enumerated under Florida Statutes.  Unequal distribution must be based on record evidence. In this case the trial court erred in awarding the Former Wife a greater share of the marital assets when it had already awarded her a balancing payment from the Former Husband in an effort to equalize the parties’ respective shares of the marital assets.  

Alimony

An award of alimony will usually not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Under Florida Statutes (2014), the trial court must be consider the list of factors set out including any other consideration necessary to do justice between the parties. Failure to do so is reversible error. In this case the trial court erred in failing to make the requisite factual findings in support of the alimony award to Former Wife. Specifically, it failed to identify or make findings of fact relative to: the standard of living established during the marriage; the contributions of each party to the marriage; the tax treatment and consequences of the alimony award; and all sources of income available to either party. Without these findings, the appeals court was unable to make a proper determination as to the appropriateness of durational alimony. The appeals court reversed and remanded.


Case:              B.L. v. D.C.F.
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Michael Heisey.
Attorneys:     Antony P. Ryan, Richard G. Bartmon, Karla Perkins.
Issues:            Dependency.

Holding:       An adjudication of dependency based entirely, or largely, on inadmissible hearsay, must be reversed. In this case, the trial court erred in determining dependency on the basis of hearsay allegations of domestic violence by the Father. The allegations came through the Mother’s statements as conveyed through the investigating officers. The appeals court reversed.


Case:              Hutchinson v. Hutchinson
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Monica J. Brasington
Attorneys:      Stephen K. Johnson, Emily A. Snider, Jonathan P. Culver.
Issues:            Alimony, Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:      A trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is governed by statute. Such awards are to ensure that both parties will have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel. The general standard for awarding attorney’s fees and costs is the requesting spouse’s financial need and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Awards of attorney’s fees are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Where marital property has been equitably distributed and the parties’ incomes have been equalized through an alimony award, a trial court abuses its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees. In this case, the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the Former Wife after it had equitably distributed the marital property and further awarded her alimony, thereby equalizing the parties’ incomes. The parties were in substantially the same financial positions and equally able to pay the fees and costs. The appeals court reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs.


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Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for 3 Weeks Ending August 16, 2015

Below are summaries of recent decisions from Florida's appellate courts on Florida divorce and family law issues.  Clicking on the case name allows you to view the appellate opinion described in the analysis below.  These summaries are courtesy of Bruce Law Firm, P.A., a law firm limited to representation of clients in the mediation, litigation and appeals of Florida marital and family law matters.  The firm also created and maintains the family law focused appellate resources website DivorceCourtAppeals.com.

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Case:              Stoltzfus v. Stoltzfus
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Marc B. Gilner.
Attorneys:     Troy H. Myers, Jr., Mark C. Dungan, Lori M. Dorman.
Issues:            Alimony.

Holding:         Moneys from retirement accounts which are distributed to the parties are considered income for the purpose of determining alimony where the principal of the retirement account will not be invaded for the purpose of support. It does not matter whether the party has attained the age at which funds may be withdrawn without penalty. Under Florida Statutes (2013), income includes retirement benefits, pensions, dividends, and interest. In this case, the trial court erred in not considering as income interest from pension accounts distributed to the Former Wife and interest-generating equalization payments from the Former Husband. The interest earned on the equalization payments fell within the statutory definition of income and should have been considered in calculating the Former Wife's income. The amended final judgment also contained a mathematical error in the calculation of the Former Wife's need. The appeals court reversed and remanded for a redetermination and recalculation.


Case:              Garcia v. Garcia
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Barbara Areces.
Attorneys:     Douglas Isenberg.
Issues:            Child support.

Holding:         Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a magistrate is responsible for creating an accurate and complete record of proceedings. A trial court may not adopt or ratify a magistrate’s report if he or she fails to file a complete record of the evidence with the report, regardless of whether exceptions have been filed to that report. If a trial court has not received a complete record, all subsequent actions based on such reports and recommendations may be deemed erroneous. In this case, the trial court erred when it ratified the general magistrate’s report despite having an incomplete record of the proceedings. A transcript from the hearing during which the testimony of the Former Husband and his accountant could not be prepared as the recording was inaudible. The testimony was absent from the record provided to the trial judge. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions to conduct further proceedings.
 


Case:              Hall v. Hall
Court:            Fouth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Timothy L. Bailey.
Attorneys:     Virginia R. Vetter, Susana Rice Roque, Linda M. Jaffe.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Marital Settlement Agreements.

Holding:         Two grounds lie for setting aside or modifying a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA):

1.     By establishing that it was reached under fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching.

2.     By establishing the MSA makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for a former spouse, given the circumstances of the parties as shown by evidence of the parties’ relative situations (including their respective ages, health, education, and financial status).  For this, determination, the trial court must find that the agreement is disproportionate to the means of the defending spouse, shown by record evidence of his or her financial means. If the MSA is found to be unreasonable, a presumption arises that either the defending spouse concealed relevant information or the challenging spouse lacked information regarding the defending spouse’s finances when the MSA was reached. The defending spouse can rebut by showing that there was full, frank disclosure or that the challenging spouse had a general and approximate knowledge of the marital property. The test is the challenging spouse’s such knowledge at the time of the MSA and whether he or she is prejudiced by lack of information.

Refusal to allow an amendment is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion unless it clearly appears that allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been abused, or amendment would be futile.

MSA Was Valid & Enforceable

Regarding the first ground, the Former Husband did not present evidence that the Former Wife or her attorney engaged in any fraud, duress, etc during the relevant proceedings. Rather, his position is that his attorney forgot to present an alleged first (missing) page of a draft version of the MSA to the Former Wife for her to consider.

As to the second ground, the Former Husband did not present evidence as to the parties’ relative situations to allow a trial court to make a decision as to its being unreasonable. The form of the MSA accepted by the trial court contained the style of the case, a clear heading, the parties’ initials, a signature page, and addressed the parties’ financial accounts by stating that they agreed to certain aspects of distribution. As such, and since he did not provide evidence of a purported additional page, the trial court did not err by ruling that the MSA filed by Former Wife was a valid, enforceable agreement.

Permission to Amend

The trial court erred when it denied the Former Husband’s motion to amend his answer on the grounds that it had been 18 months since the Former Wife filed her petition and the case was 30 days from trial. On the facts, it is not clear that allowing Former Husband leave to amend would have prejudiced Former Wife. Nor did he abuse the privilege to amend as this was his first such request. Finally, he sought to amend to raise and address relevant issues.

The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions to allow Former Husband to file his amended answer.


Case:              Kemp v. Kemp
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Daniel F. Wilensky.
Attorneys:     Seth Schwartz, Eric Lawson, Allison E. Folds.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution,  Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:         A trial court may not order an interim partial equitable distribution in the absence of a verified motion requesting same. In this case the trial court erred when, after a hearing on the Former Wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees (past due and prospective) issued an order finding that the Former Husband lacked the ability to pay her attorney’s fees and directed what was effectively an interim partial equitable distribution instead. The trial court lacked authority to do so as the relevant statutory requirements for such an order were not met. The trial court misapplied the law and failed to make proper findings to support its order. The appeals court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the Former Wife’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees.


Case:              Freiha v. Freiha
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Charles W. Arnold.
Attorneys:     William S. Graessle, Jonathan W. Graessle, Rebecca Bowen Creed.
Issues:            Procedure.

Holding:         An appeal on a non-final Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is premature. Where judgment is partial; reserves jurisdiction to expend additional judicial labor over further matters, such as non-collateral issues of child support and parental responsibility; or retains jurisdiction over integrally related issues, an appeal may be premature and improper. In this case, the appellant pursued appeal on a Final Order of Judgment that did not finally resolve integral matters. The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant to file a notice of appeal upon the rendition of a final order.


Case:              J.C. v. D.C.F.
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Rosa C. Figarola.
Attorneys:     Richard F. Joyce, Karla F. Perkins, Laura E. Lawson (Sanford).
Issues:            Termination, Case Plan.

Holding:         An order for termination must sufficiently articulates the trial court’s considerations and findings. However, if record evidence and the detailed considerations of the trial court support a finding of termination, the wording of the order in that regard may be viewed as harmless error. In this case, the trial court erred in rendering an order that was did not sufficiently articulate that the Mother: (i) materially breached her case plan, and (ii) would be unlikely or unable to comply substantially with the case plan prior to its expiration. However, the appeals court determined this was harmless error as record evidence, together with the trial court’s detailed consideration of the Mother’s conduct, supported such an order for termination. The appeals court affirmed.


Case:              Lopez v. Lopez
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Arthur M. Birken, Merrilee Ehrlich.
Attorneys:     Venol C. Adams, Susan R. Brown.
Issues:            Custody, Time-sharing.

Holding:         Orders determining the rights or obligations of a party regarding child custody or time-sharing under a parenting plan can be non-final orders. A timely motion for rehearing will suspend the rendition of a final order until the order disposing of the motion for rehearing is entered. However, a motion for rehearing does not suspend the rendition of a non-final order. Notice must be timely. In this case, the appellant (Father) appealed an order for custody, visitation and proposing a time-sharing schedule, which was conditioned on the successful outcome of reunification therapy. This was a non-final order. His notice of appeal was not filed within the procedural timelines (in this case, within thirty days) after the non-final order was rendered. The appeals court was required to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.


Case:              Whissell v. Whissell
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Jeffrey Dana Gillen.
Attorneys:     Karen J. Haas, Jonathan S. Root.
Issues:            Contempt, Procedure.

Holding:         Where an appellant has disobeyed an order of the trial court, the appellate court may, in its discretion, either entertain or dismiss an appeal. However, where a dismissal is ordered it is mandatory that the non-compliant appellant must be given a period of grace, prior to the effective date of the dismissal, in which to comply with the order(s) at issue.

In this case, the appellant repeatedly refused to comply with the trial court’s orders regarding temporary support and discovery, resulting in four findings of contempt and three writs of bodily attachment. The appellant (Former Husband) was incarcerated for such conduct and was released only after he made some payment on arrearages and promised the trial court future compliance, which he ultimately breached. The appeals court ordered the appeal be dismissed unless he established substantial compliance with the extant orders within 30 days of the appeal court decision. Jurisdiction was relinquished to the trial court for 30 days to determine the appellant’s compliance and provide a status report.


Case:              Chianese v. Brady
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Timothy Bailey.
Attorneys:     Nancy A. Hass, Cynthia L. Greene.
Issues:            Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:          The award of attorney’s fees is premised on the parties’ respective need and ability to pay. Notwithstanding, the trial court must also determine the reasonableness of the fees before ordering a party to pay fees. In this case, the trial court did not err in denying the Mother further attorney’s fees. The trial court determined that the case was “out of control”, the Mother had failed to prove the reasonableness of the fees requested, and the Father has already paid her temporary attorney’s fees. Specifically, it had previously awarded the Mother $30,000.00 for temporary fees, then denied a subsequent request for more, which denial was affirmed on appeal. She then filed an additional (third) motion for temporary attorney’s fees on the grounds that further substantial financial discovery was required as the Father was objecting and new and novel theories to obtain an increase in child support were being advanced. The appeals court affirmed the denial of additional fees.


Case:              Hutchinson v. Hutchinson
Court:            First District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Monica J. Brasington.
Attorneys:     Stephen K. Johnson, Emily A. Snider, Jonathan P. Culver.
Issues:            Alimony, Attorney’s Fees.

Holding:         An award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Under Florida Statute, such awards are to ensure that both parties have a similar ability to obtain competent legal counsel. The general consideration is the requesting spouse’s financial need and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Where the parties are equally able to pay attorney’s fees, the trial court abuses its discretion by requiring one spouse to pay the other’s fees. Where marital property has been equitably distributed and alimony is awarded such that the parties’ incomes have been equalized, a trial court abuses its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees. In this case, the trial court erred in that it awarded the Former Wife attorney’s fees after it had rendered final judgment by which equitable distribution and alimony left the parties in substantially the same financial position. The appeal court reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs.


Case:              Earl v. Earl
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Thomas H. Barkdull, III.
Attorneys:     Jane Kreusler-Walsh, Stephanie L. Serafin, Troy William Klein.
Issues:            Alimony, Procedure.

Holding:         The written findings of a trial court must conform with the oral pronouncement.  In this case, the trial court erred in failing to provide that the Former Husband obtain and maintain life insurance in the (written) final judgment of dissolution despite having made such a determination in the oral pronouncement. The appeals court reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to include the Former Husband’s requirement to maintain life insurance.


Case:              Somasca v. Somasca
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   John S. Carlin.
Attorneys:    J P. Brandon Perkins, Kristen D. Perkins, Brett C. Powell, Alexander Brockmeyer, Katheryn E. Smith.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution.

Holding:         When marital assets are used during the marriage to reduce the mortgage on non-marital property, the increase in equity on the property is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The increase in equity is not to be confused with the concept of the appreciation in the overall value of the asset. The enhancement in equity is captured under Florida Statute, which holds that marital assets and liabilities include, among other things, the enhancement in value and appreciation of non-marital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the  contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both. 

In this case, the trial court erred in its treatment of the reduction in the mortgage indebtedness on a building the Former Husband purchased prior to the marriage, which had depreciated in value (a non-marital asset). The parties used marital funds to reduce the mortgage on the building, which resulted in the Former Husband obtaining enhanced equity in the building despite the building depreciating in value during the parties’ marriage. The trial court erred in failing to give the Former Wife a credit for the use of marital funds to pay down the mortgage. The appeals court reversed the equitable distribution and remanded for correction. 


About DivorceCourtAppeals.com and Bruce Law Firm, P.A.

The Bruce Law Firm, P.A. is limited to the resolution of marital and family la w matters in Florida’s trial and appellate courts.  The firm handles divorce litigation in South Florida and accepts referrals for appellate representation in all of Florida’s appellate courts.  The firm pays referral fees in accordance with Florida Bar Rules for appellate matters, which are handled primarily on a fixed fee basis with a limited money back promise if the brief is not filed within 45 days of the firm receiving the transcript and record on appeal.

Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for Week Ending July 19, 2015

Below are summaries of recent decisions from Florida's appellate courts on Florida divorce and family law issues.  Clicking on the case name allows you to view the appellate opinion described in the analysis below.  These summaries are courtesy of Bruce Law Firm, P.A., a law firm limited to representation of clients in the mediation, litigation and appeals of Florida marital and family law matters.  The firm also created and maintains the family law focused appellate resources website DivorceCourtAppeals.com.


Case:              Fosshage v. Fosshage
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Tegan Slaton.
Attorneys:     Samuel J. Kaufman, Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Jiulio Margalli.
Issues:            Time-sharing, Modification (Permanent Residence). 

Holding:      Under Florida Statutes (2013), there is a clear distinction between modification based on changed circumstances and modification based on relocation. A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. In determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred, a trial court must consider a statutorily enumerated list of factors. A petition for relocation, on the other hand, requires a different procedure with specific statutory requirements governing the content of the petition, service on the other parent, burdens of proof, and factors to be considered by the court.

 In this case, the trial court erred in treating what was a petition for relocation as a change in circumstances and therefore did not adhere to or consider the correct process and factors. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the proper proceedings.
 


Case:              Dravis v. Dravis
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Keith Spoto.
Attorneys:     Jean Marie Henne, Shelley Harrell Shelton.
Issues:            Marital Assets, Equitable Distribution. 

Holding:         Cash Gifts 
An appeals court will review de novo a trial court's characterization of an asset as marital or nonmarital, and any factual findings necessary to make this legal conclusion, for competent, substantial evidence. Nonmarital assets may lose their nonmarital character where they have been commingled with marital assets. This is especially true with respect to money because money is fungible, and once commingled, loses its separate character. It is irrelevant that a bank account is titled in the name of one Former Spouse, alone, as it may become marital if both marital and nonmarital funds are commingled in that account. It is not necessary for commingled funds to be used to pay marital expenses in order to be treated as entirely marital; it is enough that the funds be commingled.

Dissipated Proceeds

The appeals court reviews a trial court's equitable distribution decisions for abuse of discretion and examines its valuation of marital assets to determine whether it is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Generally, it is error to include in an equitable distribution scheme any assets that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings. The exception, however, is where misconduct during the divorce case results in the dissipation of a marital asset. To determine whether such misconduct occurred, the trial court must assess whether one spouse used marital funds for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. Further, such misconduct must be supported by the record evidence, and by specific factual findings of the trial court.

In this case, the trial court did not err in its determination as to misconduct and characterization of marital assets. The trial court did, however, err regarding the equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets. Competent, substantial evidence demonstrated that certain nonmarital assets (being the proceeds of monetary gifts to the Former Wife) were commingled with proceeds that were marital assets. The monetary gifts therefore lost their nonmarital character and became marital assets subject to equitable distribution. However, the trial court failed to make specific factual findings on the matter. This necessitated the reversal of the judgment on that issue. The appeals court affirmed as to the cash gifts and alimony, but reversed and remanded for further proceedings on equitable distribution.


Case:              Dickson v. Dickson
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Mark J. Hill.
Attorneys:     Nicholas A. Shannin, Lauren M. Ilvento, Barry P. Burnette, Matthew B. Capstraw
Issues:            Timesharing. 

Holding:        A trial court's order modifying a parenting plan and timesharing schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The trial court has less authority and discretion to modify timesharing than it does to make the initial timesharing determination. Under Florida Statutes (2013), relocation is a change in the location of the principal residence of a parent or other person from his or her principal place of residence at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing. Further, the change of location must be at least 50 miles from that residence. In the absence of a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the proper method to measure the distance between two points is the straight-line or “as the crow flies” measure. Under the principle of shared parental responsibility, major decisions affecting the welfare of a child are to be made after the parents confer and reach an agreement. If the parents reach an impasse, the dispute should be presented to the court for resolution whereby the court must resolve the impasse by determining the best interests of the child.

In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the timesharing agreement without evidence that the welfare of the minor child would be promoted by a return to the school the minor child had previously attended and modifying the timesharing arrangement so that the Father assumed the primary timesharing responsibilities. The Mother’s move did not violate the marital settlement agreement or the relocation statute. While the timesharing schedule largely met the statutory requirements, it did not include a school designation, and the marital settlement agreement did not expressly prohibit a move. Further, the parties agreed that the Mother moved forty-nine miles “as the crow flies,” using the straight-line test and was not required to file a petition to relocate. However, the dissolution final judgment gave the parties shared parental responsibility on major decisions, including educational matters. Because the parties were unable to agree on the minor child’s school, the Mother was required to obtain court approval before unilaterally changing the schools the minor child attended. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions.


Case:              Rossi v. Rossi
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Kelly J. McKibben.
Attorneys:     Joe Teague Caruso.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution. 

Holding:         A trial court's determination that a motion or other filing is improper, as labelled, is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Where it is apparent that an improperly-labelled motion is intended to operate as an authorized motion, an appellate court must consider the motion as if it were properly labelled. Where a party files a motion that would be unauthorized based on the motion's title, Florida courts will consider the motion's substance in determining whether the motion was authorized. The mislabelling of a motion will not preclude consideration. In this case, the trial court erred as it failed to consider the content of an improperly-labelled motion for rehearing and treated the motion as a list of exceptions. Specifically, the trial court found no issue with the substantive content of the Former Wife's list of exceptions. That finding necessarily implied that the substantive content of the motion for rehearing—which was identical to the list of exceptions was also sufficient. The trial court should have treated Former Wife's unauthorized motion for rehearing as an authorized list of exceptions and should have held a hearing on the magistrate's report. The appeals court reversed the trial court's entry of final judgment and remanded for a hearing on the Former Wife's list of exceptions to the magistrate's report.


About DivorceCourtAppeals.com and Bruce Law Firm, P.A.

The Bruce Law Firm, P.A. is limited to the resolution of marital and family la w matters in Florida’s trial and appellate courts.  The firm handles divorce litigation in South Florida and accepts referrals for appellate representation in all of Florida’s appellate courts.  The firm pays referral fees in accordance with Florida Bar Rules for appellate matters, which are handled primarily on a fixed fee basis with a limited money back promise if the brief is not filed within 45 days of the firm receiving the transcript and record on appeal.

Florida Divorce & Family Law Update for 2 Weeks Ending July 5, 2015

Below are summaries of recent decisions from Florida's appellate courts on Florida divorce and family law issues.  Clicking on the case name allows you to view the appellate opinion described in the analysis below.  These summaries are courtesy of Bruce Law Firm, P.A., a law firm limited to representation of clients in the mediation, litigation and appeals of Florida marital and family law matters.  The firm also created and maintains the family law focused appellate resources website DivorceCourtAppeals.com.


Case:             Smith v. Smith
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:  Gilbert A. Smith, Jr., Diana L. Moreland.
Attorneys:     Edward B. Sobel, Angela D. Flaherty.
Issues:           Equitable Distribution, Attorney’s Fees. 
Holding:         Equitable Distribution

An appeals court reviews de novo a trial court's determination of whether an asset is marital or non-marital. Where parties did not enter into marital settlement agreement, the applicable date for determining whether assets and liabilities are classified as marital or non-marital is the date of the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage. Assets and liabilities not in existence on that date should not be classified as marital.

In this case the trial court erred when it included as marital assets in the equitable distribution scheme both a vehicle, which was owned by the Former Husband at the time the petition was filed but sold during the pendency of the divorce, and a second vehicle, which was purchased by him after the date of filing but prior to the final judgment. The appeals court concluded that it was error to include the second vehicle in the equitable distribution scheme.  The appeals court reverse and directed the trial court to strike the second vehicle from the equitable distribution scheme and reduce the equalizing payment owed to the Former Wife accordingly. 

Attorney’s Fees

An appeals court does not have jurisdiction to review attorney’s fees if the trial court’s ruling only addresses entitlement but does not set an amount. In this case, the trial court's ruling on attorney's fees and costs only addressed the relative position of the parties and entitlement but failed to set an amount. As a result, the appeals court lacked jurisdiction to review.


Case:             M.M. v. D.C.F.S
Court:            Third District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Rosa C. Figarola.
Attorneys:     Eugene F. Zenobi, Kevin Coyle Colbert, Cathi Gordon Graham, Angela D. Flaherty, Karla Perkins.
Issues:           Procedure, Dependency. 
Holding:         Procedure

Any party can request termination of agency supervision or the jurisdiction of the court by a written motion or in a written report to the court. In this case, the trial court did not err in granting the order for cessation of supervision of the dependent children by the DCF despite being ordered without a motion. Here, the Father argued the order denied him due process because departmental supervision was terminated without a motion. In fact, the DCF requested termination of supervision in a Judicial Review and Social Study Report filed with the trial court, the receipt of which was acknowledge by the Father’s attorney prior to the Judicial Review Hearing. No challenge of the request for termination of supervision was raised. The appeals court denied the petition insofar as it was determined there was no departure from the essential requirements of law and due process as the Father received notice via the filed report.

Dependency/Visitation

Florida Statutes affords a parent the unqualified ability to return to the dependency court to seek modification or elimination of any court ordered restrictions on his or her visitation rights.  If a parent who has not had his or her parental rights terminated makes a motion for reunification or increased contact with the child, the court shall hold a hearing. Notwithstanding that the wishes of the dependent children, who may be at or near their teenage years, may, practically, affect a parent’s future contacts and relationship with them, the dependency court has a non-delegable duty to consider any motion for modification or for increased contact filed by a parent in the future.  In this case, the trial court erred when it departed from the essential requirements of law by restricting decisions concerning the Father’s future contact with his children solely to its discretion. The appeals court reversed that portion of the order which limited the Father’s ability to seek contact with his children in the future.


Case:             Elias v. Elias
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:  David E. French.
Attorneys:     Howard M. Rudolph, Caryn A. Stevens, Joel M. Weissman.
Issues:            Child Support
Holding:          

Florida Statutes present Guidelines as the starting point for determining child support orders (both temporary and final). Awards of child support shall be based on the application of these Guidelines. After calculating a Guideline amount based on each parent’s net monthly income and the children’s need for support, the trial court may deviate from the Guideline amount based on a variety of factors, however, child support pursuant to the Guidelines must be determined before the trial court deviates.

In this case, the trial court erred in failing to apply the Guidelines despite the Former Husband’s objections. Specifically, it erred in determining that neither party needed to pay child support; in concluding that the Former Wife’s annual income of over $1 million allowed her to provide for most of the children’s needs by direct payments to vendors and providers, as she volunteered to do; and by treating expenditures for the three minor children made by the Former Husband (who had fifty-percent time-sharing) as largely incidental. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to follow the statutory procedure


Case:             Boyd v. Boyd
Court:            Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:  Renee Goldenberg.
Attorneys:     Robert D. Burgs, Catherine L. Roselli.
Issues:            Child Support. 
Holding:        

A trial court’s decision to accept or reject a magistrate’s conclusions is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A magistrate’s findings are subject to being set aside by the trial court when they are clearly erroneous or the magistrate misconceived the legal effect of the evidence. In this case, the trial court erred in approving the general magistrate’s report and recommendation where the evidence showed the magistrate was expected, but failed, to set an arrearage amount (and there was sufficient evidence available to do so).  The appeals court reversed and remanded for the trial court to resolve the issue of arrearages.


Case:             Suleiman v. Yunis
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:  Alan S. Apte.
Attorneys:     Adam H. Sudbury.
Issues:           Time-Sharing, Procedure.
Holding:

Pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appeals court has jurisdiction to address matters of denials of due process. Failure to give notice of a hearing to the opposing party absent a true emergency deprives the opposing party of its right to procedural due process. Courts reverse those temporary custody orders which are entered without notice; or with insufficient notice; or with insufficient opportunity to be heard. In order to prevail on a request for a temporary modification of custody, the moving party must meet the burden of proving that (1) a substantial change in the condition of one or both of the parties has occurred, and (2) the best interests of the child will be promoted by the change although the entry of an emergency ex parte order temporarily changing custody might be warranted under certain circumstances, such as where a child is threatened with physical harm or is about to be improperly removed from the state.

In this case, the trial court erred insofar as it denied, at the hearing on Former Wife’s motion to vacate, her requested relief notwithstanding that she presented sufficient and cogent evidence on point; the Former Husband failed to provide sufficient evidence in support of the ex parte order; a substantial change of circumstances had occurred; and that the best interests of the children would be promoted by modifying the timesharing schedule. The lower court abused its discretion in its failure to properly resolve the issue given the lack of evidence in support of the order it issued. The appeals court reversed and vacated the orders.


Case:             Richeson v. Richeson
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Sally D.M. Kest.
Attorneys:     Jeffrey A. Conner, Frank J. Bankowitz.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution. 
Holding:         Partitioning

A trial court has no authority to partition jointly-held property in the absence of the parties' agreement or a specific pleading requesting partition. In this case, the trial court erred in ordering the sale of certain real property in the absence of any pleading for partition of the property. The appeals court reversed the portion of the trial court's order directing partition and directed the reinstatement of the equitable distribution scheme set forth in the original final judgment.

Credit for Moneys Paid During Pendency

Claims for credit on moneys paid on assets during pendency must be supported by competent and sufficient evidence. In this case, the trial court did not err when it denied to award the Former Husband credit for moneys he allegedly paid to maintain joint investments during pendency. At trial, the Former Husband's only evidence with regard to his claim was a summary statement listing numerous deposits he made to an account maintained for management of the parties' investment properties. However, he presented no evidence as to the source of the funds, including whether any of the funds derived from rental income on those properties. The trial court recognized this deficiency and directed him to provide supplemental documentation, but he failed to do so. The appeals court affirmed this portion of the order.


Case:             Sowell v. McConnell
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   S. Sue Robbins.
Attorneys:     Christina D'Amato-Miller, Mark D. Shelnutt, Rebecca A. Guthrie.
Issues:            Child Support.   
Holding:        

Florida Statutes (2013) require parties to pay the uncovered medical expenses of a child according to their percentage share of child support. In this case, the trial court erred by failing to require the Former Husband to reimburse the Former Wife for a portion of the minor children's medical expenses incurred during the parties' separation. Although the Former Husband asserts that the Former Wife did not present any evidence regarding the medical bills (including the dates of medical service, nature, necessity, or reasonableness of those bills) the bills were admitted into evidence during trial and the Former Husband voiced no objections when the Former Wife testified as to amounts. As such, the Former Wife was entitled to receive partial reimbursement for the medical bills she introduced into evidence. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the trial court to calculate and award her  portion of the medical bills she paid.


Case:             Stantchev v. Stantcheva
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Jonathan D. Ohlman.
Attorneys:     Jonathan P. Culver, Robert H. Mclean.
Issues:            Equitable Distribution, Attorney’s Fees. 
Holding:         Non-Marital Assets

Non-marital assets are excluded from equitable distribution. In this case, the trial court erred in making a distribution scheme which did included a particular account as a marital asset when it should have been excluded as it belonged to the Former Husband before the parties were married. The appeals court remanded and directed the trial court to revise the distribution scheme accordingly.

Valuation of Assets

The date for determining value of marital assets is the date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable under the circumstances. In this case, the trial court erred in valuing an amount of money the Former Husband transferred to a Hungarian bank weeks prior to the Former Wife initiating divorce proceedings as at the date of the transfer rather than the date it was converted back (at a lower rate of exchange resulting in a substantial loss in value). The trial court should have ordered both parties bear an equal share of the resultant loss in value of the account rather than have it lie with the Former Husband (particularly as the Former Husband did not know she intended to commence proceedings). Note that the appeals court found that the trial court was properly within its discretion in assessing the value of such moneys but the error lay in the date the trial court applied to value the asset. The appeals court directed that the loss resulting from the currency exchange be considered on remand.

Attorney’s Fees

In considering equitable distribution, the trial court may consider any amounts paid by a Former Spouse to his or her attorney which are sourced from marital assets and taken and paid in advance of the commencement of proceedings.  In this case, the trial court erred in ordering the Former Husband to pay one-half of the Former Wife’s attorney’s fees when she used marital funds for the down payment for her attorney’s fees while the parties were still living together. After they separated, the Former Husband commenced paying temporary alimony which was specifically designed to include Former Wife’s fees. Given the subsequent equitable distribution of assets, each party had the ability to pay his or her own fees and the trial court was directed to reconsider the matter on remand. 


Case:             Banks v. Banks
Court:            Second District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Tracy Sheehan.
Attorneys:      E. Jane Brehany, Allison M. Perry.
Issues:            Alimony, Equitable Distribution. 
Holding:         Alimony

An appellant must provide, for the record, a statement of the evidence prepared in accordance with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. When the appellant fails to provide this court with a record that is sufficient to evaluate the appellant's contentions of error, the appeals court must presume that the trial court's decision is correct.  However, the absence of a transcript and a statement of the evidence do not preclude reversal where an error of law is apparent on the face of the judgment. In such cases, the appeals court must limit consideration of the arguments on appeal to errors appearing on the face of the amended final judgment. A trial court can award permanent alimony in a marriage of moderate duration if such an award is based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors set forth in relevant statutory provisions. Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in the relevant statutory provisions, however there is no requirement that such an award meet the clear and convincing standard of proof.

In this case, the trial court erred in failing to award the Former Wife in a long term (33 year) marriage permanent alimony on the basis that she had failed to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof. As this was a long term marriage, the trial court ought to have simply assessed the evidence based on the relevant statutory factors. The appeals court reversed the amended final judgment regarding the denial of the Former Wife's claim for an award of permanent periodic alimony and remanded for reconsideration with directions the trial court on remand should consider making an award of at least a nominal amount of permanent periodic alimony.

Former Husband’s Military Retirement Pay

Language in final judgments needs to be specific, unambiguous and allow for intended changes in the amount of such awards tied to cost of living increases or other such considerations. In this case, the trial court erred in ordering an amount, and an indexed award, of the Former Husband’s military pension payable to the Former Wife, such amount being expressed as both a percentage and specific dollar figure, thereby creating ambiguity as the dollar amount could change as certain specific adjustments are based on the order are made. The appeals court directed, on remand, that the wording be amended.


Case:             Dottaviano v. Dottaviano
Court:            Fifth District Court of Appeal.
Trial Judge:   Clyde E. Wolfe.
Attorneys:      Daniel A. Bushell, Shachar D. Spiegel, Stefani K. Nolan, Brian P. North, David Merritt.
Issues:            Child Support, Equitable Distribution, Alimony. 
Holding:         Imputing Income

Florida Statutes provide that monthly income shall be imputed to an unemployed or underemployed parent if such unemployment or underemployment is found by the court to be voluntary on that parent’s part. A trial court must employ a two-step analysis when deciding whether to impute income to a former spouse. Firstly, the trial court must determine that termination of employment was voluntary. Secondly, the trial court must determine whether the individual’s subsequent unemployment or underemployment resulted from the  pursuit of his or her own interests or through less than diligent and bona fide efforts to find employment paying income at a level equal to or better than that formerly received. Further, the former spouse claiming that income should be imputed to the unemployed or underemployed spouse bears the burden of showing both employability and the availability of jobs.

In this case, the trial court erred in imputing monthly income to the Former Wife when it failed to make a specific finding that she was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Nor did the trial court properly address that the Former Husband did not discharge the onus upon him to show that she was employable and there were available jobs for her. Finally, the trial court failed to properly address the Former Wife’s evidence as to her bona fide efforts to obtain employment.  The appeals court reversed and remanded with direction to reconsider alimony and child support, as those awards were tied to the improper imputation of income.

Matrimonial Home

Generally, the trial court should award the primary residential parent exclusive use and possession of the marital residence until the child reaches majority or is emancipated. However, special circumstances may justify partition and sale of the marital home where the parties’ incomes are inadequate to meet their debts, obligations, and normal living expenses, as well as the expense of maintaining the marital residence. Special circumstances that justify the partition of the marital home can include instances where the parties resided in the marital residence for a short period of time, lacked other significant marital assets, and a large differential in relative earning power existed between the former spouses. In this case, the trial court erred in granting exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the Former Husband, despite the residence of the minor child being there with him, insofar as this circumstance fell into one of those special circumstances warranting partition of the marital home. Specifically, the family had lived in the martial home for a short period of time when the parties separated, the parties do not have any other significant martial assets, and there is a large difference in the parties’ earning capacity. Moreover, the payments related to the marital home are significant and the Former Husband could find a place for himself and the minor child to live that is less expensive. The appeals court ordered, on remand, that the trial court order the marital home be partitioned.


About DivorceCourtAppeals.com and Bruce Law Firm, P.A.

The Bruce Law Firm, P.A. is limited to the resolution of marital and family la w matters in Florida’s trial and appellate courts.  The firm handles divorce litigation in South Florida and accepts referrals for appellate representation in all of Florida’s appellate courts.  The firm pays referral fees in accordance with Florida Bar Rules for appellate matters, which are handled primarily on a fixed fee basis with a limited money back promise if the brief is not filed within 45 days of the firm receiving the transcript and record on appeal.